He taught at the Université Catholique de Louvain from 2000 to 2005, and as a "professeur invité" at the Université de Cergy Pontoise and at Paris-Dauphine. He spent research periods at Tel Aviv University, Brown University and the IMF. He has been principal investigator in a PRIN project on “Markets with asymmetric information”, and a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Mathematical Economics. Teaching experience: microeconomics, game theory, and general equilibrium theory, both at the graduate and at the undergraduate level. Main research interests: general equilibrium theory, models of knowledge and information.

Recent Publications

• Minelli, E., “Merit and Rent in a Growing Economy”, Economic Letters, 151: 107-110, 2017.
• Heifetz, A. and E. Minelli, “Aspiration Traps”, Berkeley Electronic Journal of Theoretical Economics, 15: 125-142, 2015.
• Meier, M., E. Minelli and H. Polemarchakis, “Competitive Equilibria with Private Information on Both Sides”, Economic Theory, 55: 257-289, 2014.
• Bisin, A., J. Geanakoplos, P. Gottardi, E. Minelli and H. Polemarchakis, “Markets and Contracts”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 47: 279-288, 2011.
• Forges, F. and E. Minelli, “Afriat’s Theorem for General Budget Sets”, Journal of Economic Theory, 144: 135-145, 2009.